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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This case is on appeal from a decision by the district court in its appellate
capacity. The district court affirmed a magistrate judge's pre-trial ruling denying
David M. Knott's motion to exclude evidence in his prosecution for driving under
the influence.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Police officer Adam Johnson arrested David M. Knott for driving under the
influence (DUI) in Ketchum, Idaho. (R., pp. 5, 24.) Officer Johnson took Knott to
the Sun Valley Police Department to administer a breath (BAC) test. (Id.) There,
the officer played an audio tape of a warning, and also provided the warning in
writing, describing the consequences of Knott's refusal to take the BAC test.
(Id.)

Although Knott's suspension advisory form (Exhibit A) is illegible, it is

undisputed it provided that his non-resident driver's license would not be seized. 1
(R., pp. 26, 50.) Knott resides in, and holds a driver's license from, New York
state. (R., pp. 5, 24.) Knott refused the BAC test. (R., p. 24.)
Following a hearing regarding Knott's BAC refusal, Magistrate Judge
Walker entered an order dismissing the license suspension.

(R., pp. 24-25.)

Judge Walker reasoned that the suspension advisory communicated to Knott

This can be inferred from the magistrate's decision (R., p. 50), which quotes as
comparable, the advisory given the driver in State v. Kling, 150 Idaho 188, 245
P.3d 499 (Ct. App. 2010). In Kling. the court noted, "The advisory given to Kling .
. . directly contradicted the statutory directive by affirmatively informing Kling that
her nonresident driver's license would not be seized by the officer." Kling, 150
Idaho at 192,245 P.3d at 503.
1

1

either failed to accurately state the statutory consequences of refusal, or was
"impermissibly ambiguous when applied to out-of-state drivers." (R., p. 25.)
The state prosecuted Knott for DUI. (R., p. 34.) Knott moved to exclude
evidence of his refusal (R., pp. 35-36), and the magistrate judge denied the
motion (R., pp. 49-56). Knott pleaded guilty (R., pp. 76-77), but retained the right
to appeal the denial of his suppression motion (R., p. 76). On appeal, the district
court affirmed the magistrate court's ruling.
appeals to this Court. (R., pp. 144-46.)

2

(R., p. 142.)

Knott now timely

ISSUE
Knott states the issue on appeal as:
Whether the State in its case-in-chief can present evidence that an
out-of-state licensed driver refused the evidentiary test despite a
court ruling that the officer improperly advised him of the
consequences of a refusal.
(Appellant's brief, p. 3.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Knott failed to demonstrate the magistrate court erred or abused its
discretion in denying suppression of his breath test refusal because the record
and applicable case law support that his refusal was relevant and its probative
value was not outweighed by any prejudicial effect?

3

ARGUMENT
Knott Has Failed To Demonstrate The Magistrate Court Erred Or Abused Its
Discretion In Denying Suppression Of His Breath Test Refusal Because The
Record And Applicable Case Law Support That His Refusal Was Relevant And
Its Probative Value Was Not Outweighed By Any Prejudicial Effect
A.

Introduction
Knott's refusal of the breath test was relevant to his prosecution for DUI

as evidence of consciousness of guilt.

The magistrate court found that the

potential for unfair prejudice from evidence of Knott's refusal did not substantially
outweigh its probative value, and the district court agreed. On this appeal, Knott
fails to show the magistrate court erred or abused its discretion in denying
exclusion of his refusal.
B.

Standard Of Review
The appellate court directly reviews a decision by a district court made in

its appellate capacity. State v. Decker, 152 Idaho 142, 145, 267 P.3d 729, 732
(Ct. App. 2011) (citation omitted). The appellate court accepts the magistrate's
factual findings supported by substantial and competent evidence, but freely
reviews legal conclusions. State v. Green, 149 Idaho 706, 708, 239 P.3d 811,
813 (Ct. App. 201 O); Decker, 152 Idaho at 145, 267 P.3d at 732; Green, 149
Idaho at 708, 239 P.3d at 813. Where the magistrate's decision is supported by
the record and law, and where the district court affirmed, the appellate court will
affirm "as a matter of procedure."

kl

For issues concerning admissibility of evidence, the appellate court
applies a mixed standard of review. State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 363,
4

247 P.3d 582, 590 (2010) (citation omitted).

First, the appellate court freely

reviews the legal question whether evidence is relevant.

kl

Next, the appellate

court reviews for abuse of discretion, the trial court's weighing of the evidence's
probative value against its prejudicial effect.

kl

For this, the appellate court

considers whether the court below (1) understood its decision was discretionary,
(2) acted within the scope of its discretion and consistent with applicable legal
standards, and (3) exercised reason in reaching its decision.

C.

kl

Knott's Breath Test Refusal Was Relevant To His Prosecution For DUI
Evidence is relevant where it has a "tendency to make the existence of

any fact ... of consequence to the determination of the action more ... or less
probable than it would be without the evidence." I.RE. 401. The very language
of Idaho's DUI law anticipates the relevance of both breath test results and
refusals. I.C. § 18-8004. It is unlawful to have an alcohol concentration of 0.08
or more "as shown by analysis of [a driver's] blood, urine, or breath." I.C. § 188004(1)(a).

But the state shall not prosecute anyone having an alcohol

concentration less than 0.08; and anyone who does not take a test for alcohol
concentration may be prosecuted for DUI. I.C. § 18-8004(2). By refusing a test
that would

either support or preclude

his

prosecution

for

DUI,

Knott

demonstrated consciousness of guilt, rendering his refusal relevant.
The Court must next consider whether the magistrate court abused its
discretion in weighing the probative value of Knott's refusal against its prejudicial
effect. Shackelford, 150 Idaho at 363, 247 P.3d at 590.

5

D.

Knott Has Failed To Show The Magistrate Court Abused Its Discretion In
Light Of The Record And Applicable Case Law

1.

The Record Shows The Magistrate Court Was Aware It Had
Discretion And Exercised Reason

The first and third elements of an abuse of discretion analysis consider
whether the magistrate court knew its decision was discretionary, and whether it
exercised reason in reaching its decision. Shackelford, 150 Idaho at 363, 247
P.3d at 590. The first element is satisfied where the trial court recognizes it has
a choice in rendering its decision.

Sun Valley Shopping Center, Inc. v. Idaho

Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991 ).

As to the third

element, the appellate courts have not required a lengthy discussion to
demonstrate an exercise of reason. See State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 60001, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333-34 (1989).
Under Rule 403, evidence may be excluded where "its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." I.RE. 403. In this
case, the magistrate court heard the parties' oral arguments, and considered
written argument from Knott's counsel.

(See 4/25/11 Tr.; R., pp. 38-41.) In a

written decision, the magistrate addressed the parties' legal arguments. (R., pp.
49-56.)

The

magistrate

found

Knott's

refusal

was

"probative

of his

consciousness of guilt," and concluded that the "[i]mproper warnings about the
consequences of refusal in a separate civil proceeding do not make that
evidence so prejudicial that admission of it is prohibited."

(R., p. 56.)

This

analysis, although brief, shows awareness of the need to balance probative
value against prejudicial effect, and demonstrates that the magistrate's decision

6

was reached through reason. The first and third elements of the discretionary
test are therefore satisfied.

2.

Knott Has Not Shown the Magistrate Court Abused Its Discretion In
Weighing The Probative Value Against The Prejudicial Effect Of
Knott's Breath Test Refusal

Knott's primary argument is that his refusal should have been suppressed
for lack of foundation. (Appellant's brief, pp. 4-12.) Knott acknowledges that a
driver's refusal infers consciousness of guilt, but contends that admissibility of
refusal requires that a driver be properly advised of the refusal's consequences.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 4-6.) According to Knott, an improper warning vitiates the
driver's ability to knowingly, willfully, and voluntarily refuse, thus causing the
refusal's probative value to be substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
(Appellant's brief, p. 6.) In support, Knott cites a district court's decisions in State
v. Salts, Blaine County Case CR-2003-15090 (R., pp. 43-47; Appellant's brief, p.
5). The Salts decision is neither binding nor persuasive here.
In Salts, the district court affirmed a magistrate's decision excluding
refusal evidence in a DUI prosecution. (Id.) The magistrate concluded this result
was required under Matter of Virgil, 126 Idaho 946, 895 P.2d 182 (Ct. App.
1995), which dismissed a license suspension under Idaho's implied consent law.
Although Idaho's implied consent law requires a driver to be informed about the
consequences of refusal, I.C. § 18-8002(3), Idaho's DUI law has no similar
requirement, I.C. § 18-8004. The magistrate in Salts therefore misapplied Virgil,
and the Court here should reject the reasoning in Salts as unsound.

7

Importantly, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized the competence and
admissibility of a refusal in a DUI prosecution in State v. Bock, 80 Idaho 296,
309, 328 P.2d 1065, 1073 (1958). There, the court held that a driver's refusal,
"[l]ike any other act or statement voluntarily made by him ... [is] competent for
the jury to consider and weigh, with the other evidence, and to draw from it
whatever inference as to guilt or innocence may be justified thereby."
(emphasis added).

kl

Officer Johnson's inaccurate warning did not, as Knott

suggests, render his refusal inadmissible. (Appellant's brief, pp. 4-5.) Instead,
the inaccurate warning is other evidence for the jury to consider and weigh, with
the refusal. Bock, 80 Idaho at 309, 328 P.2d at 1073. 2 Knott has not shown that
his refusal is so prejudicial - or indeed prejudicial at all - so as to require its
exclusion, rather than allowing the jury to make its findings and inferences as
trier of fact. That the jury may draw an inference unfavorable to Knott does not
render the evidence unduly prejudicial.
Ultimately, Knott offers unsupported, unspecific conclusions that he
suffered prejudice. Absent showing of unfair prejudice that substantially
outweighs his refusal's probative value, Knott fails to demonstrate the magistrate
court abused its discretion.

The Bock court also noted, Idaho statutes contain no provision that a refusal is
inadmissible, and "the courts should not add a limitation which the legislature has
not seen fit to impose." Bock, 80 Idaho at 309, 328 P.2d at 1073 (citing thenexistence of such provisions in Oregon and Washington statutes). Despite
changes to Idaho law since Bock was decided, the Idaho legislature has not
amended or added any provision excluding or limiting the admissibility of refusal
in DUI prosecutions. See I.C. §§ 18-8002, 18-8004.
2
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E.

Knott Has Failed To Show That Admissibility of Refusal Evidence Is
Contingent On Compliance With The Warning Requirement In Idaho's
Implied Consent Law
Applicable law supports the district court's order denying exclusion of

Knott's refusal. While drivers may physically refuse breath-alcohol tests, there is
no legal right of refusal in Idaho. State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 372, 775
P.2d 1210, 1214 (1989). The out-of-state cases cited by Knott (Appellant's brief,
pp. 6-10) are thus legally, as well as factually distinguishable. See Longley v.
State, 776 P.2d 339, 344 (Alaska App. 1989) (refusal held not admissible
because made before driver received any implied consent warning); Moore v.
State, 458 S.E.2d 479, 480 (Georgia App. 1998) (refusal held inadmissible
where driver was not advised he could pay for additional test by qualified person
of his choosing, as required by statute); State v. Miceli, 554 N.W.2d 427, 431
(Nebraska App. 1996) (refusal held inadmissible where driver was advised using
form previously held to constitute plain error); Janak v. State, 826 S.W.2d 803,
805 (Texas App. 1992) (refusal held inadmissible absent evidence statutory
warning was given).
The Idaho Supreme Court considered the admissibility of a blood test
result in State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 775 P.2d 1210 (1989). In that case,
the court quoted a Wisconsin Supreme Court decision disapproving use of the
implied consent law as a shield "to prevent constitutionally obtained evidence
from being admitted at trial."

Woolery, 116 Idaho at 371, 775 P.2d at 1213

(citing State v. Zielke, 137 Wis.2d 39, 403 N.W.2d 427, 434 (1987)).

The

Woolery court also cited the South Dakota Supreme Court, which held that a
refusal does not require suppression of evidence where law enforcement fails to
9

comply with statutory procedures. Woolery. 116 Idaho at 372, 775 P.2d at 1214
(citing State v. Hartman, 256 N.W.2d 131 (S.D. 1977)). The Woolery court then
held that, so long as a driver's constitutional rights are preserved, the state
"should not be prevented from obtaining such relevant evidence as the alcohol
content of the driver's blood." Woolery, 116 Idaho at 373, 775 P.2d at 1215.
In addition, the court highlighted that Idaho's implied consent law "is
devoted entirely to the administrative, or civil, suspension" of a driver's license,
and does not discuss DUI or other criminal offenses.

Id. at 373, 775 P.2d at

1215. As such, the intent of the law was not "to hamstring the ability of law
enforcement to properly investigate and obtain evidence."

kl

Citing the U.S.

Supreme Court, the Woolery court noted that, where constitutional standards for
search and seizure are satisfied, an officer's failure to comply with Idaho's
implied consent law should not render the results of an evidentiary test
inadmissible in a criminal prosecution.

kl

at 374, 775 P.2d at 1216 (citing

Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)).
Although Knott's case involves a refusal rather than unconsented-to test
results, the Woolery court's reasoning logically applies. Idaho's implied consent
law was not intended to exclude evidence in a DUI prosecution, but to encourage
the collection of evidence for the prosecution.

kl at 374,

775 P.2d at 1216; I.C.

§ 18-8002. An officer's failure to comply with statutory requirements for a license
suspension warrants dismissal of a licensing action; however, it cannot be used
as a shield to exclude constitutionally obtained evidence from trial. Woolery, 116
Idaho at 371, 775 P.2d at 1213 (citation omitted).
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The United States Supreme Court has held that neither Due Process
concerns nor the Fifth Amendment require exclusion of a refusal, even where
police fail to warn that refusal could be used against the defendant at trial. South
Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983). Knott has not asserted his constitutional
rights were violated.

Nor does the record support any such finding.

Under

applicable law, there was no basis to exclude evidence of Knott's refusal from his
DUI prosecution.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the state respectfully requests that the Court
affirm the district court's decision affirming the magistrate court below.
DATED this 8th day of February, 2013.

D~~

Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 8th day of February, 2013, I caused two
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed
in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
ANDREW H. PARNES
Law Office of Andrew Parnes
PO Box 5988
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DATHNE. HUANG
Deputy Attorney Ge::
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